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EU FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE AND TRANSPARENCY REGULATION: A TEST FOR THE EFFECTIVENESS OF POST CRISIS ADMINISTRATIVE GOVERNANCE

I. TRANSPARENCY REGULATION AND EU FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE: WHY
IT MATTERS
X. 01 It is axiomatic that, in the wake of the far-reaching crisis-era reforms which took place over 2008-2014, the 'single rulebook' which now governs EU financial markets has become wider, deeper, more technical, and more complex, and that the EU's related ascendancy over its Member
States with respect to financial market rule-making has become almost total. 1 The scale of this recasting of EU financial market regulation is well-illustrated by the new trading transparency regime 2 which will apply to EU financial markets once the Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive II 2014 and Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 2014 3 apply to EU financial markets in 2019. 4 As noted in section II below, transparency rules govern the disclosures on trading activity which must be made available by those market actors subject to transparency requirements; these actors are typically trading venues, in respect of multilateral trading on organized venues, and banks/investment firms of various types, in respect of bilateral, off-venue trading between counterparties.
X.02
The new trading transparency rules, which are contained in the MiFIR Regulation and which will accordingly apply without further implementation by the Member States, exemplify ESMA's September 2015 proposed BTSs cover, for example, the empirical calculations governing when an interest rate derivative is liquid for the purposes of transparency regulation.
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regulation. As has been widely discussed in the literature, MiFID I was a classic market-shaping measure in that it sought to change EU market microstructure by using law to liberalize share trading in the EU and to reallocate the benefits of share trading from the major trading venues (which benefited from a 'concentration' rule which allowed share trading to be funneled to the major stock exchanges) and across a wider range of execution venues. 14 Like MiFID I, MiFID II/MiFIR also has market-shaping ambitions. But, and reflecting the crisis-era reform context and the related driving concern to increase transparency on market activity generally, it has a more prescriptive orientation, particularly with respect to share trading. X.05 But the market-shaping effects of MiFIR may also take the form of unintended consequences. Chief among these is the potential generation of regulatory incentives to marketmakers to decrease liquidity supply in the non-equity markets. There are accordingly contradictions within the MiFIR/MiFID II regime as much of the regime is otherwise directed to ensuring that the supply of liquidity from market-makers is appropriately managed by trading venues. 18 In particular, the new transparency requirements may increase the market impact/position risks carried by those supplying liquidity to the non-equity markets, increase their costs, and thereby create incentives to reduce dealing/liquidity supply activities. The new transparency rules are accordingly increasingly being associated with the creation of potentially significant and unpredictable market-shaping effects deriving from their potential to contract trading across a wide range of asset classes previously not subject to transparency regulation, and to generate, as a result, related risks to market liquidity (see section II below on the interaction between liquidity and transparency regulation). 19 The new bond market transparency rules, for example, may have unforeseen effects arising from the uncertain nature of their interaction with the wider market restructuring which is currently re-shaping bond market trading (this re-shaping is being driven by a range of factors, including the higher capital charges being imposed on market-making activities and the related movement by market-makers from principal to agency trading) and which is being associated with a thinning of bond market liquidity and with greater volatility. 20 A concern for bond market liquidity is beginning to seep into EU financial markets policy. The Commission's September 2015 Capital Markets Union Action Plan, which is currently framing capital market policy development in the EU, notes market concern in relation to the risks to liquidity in secondary bond market trading, and the related risks to the EU economy arising from any related future contraction in the primary issuance market and in higher borrowing costs for firms. Although the Commission has asserted that the new MiFIR transparency regime should increase the attractiveness of the EU capital market, it has also committed to monitoring developments in this area. 21 that MiFIR will generate a powerful case study for examination of the relationship between law and markets.
X.07 From a more institutionalist perspective, the MiFIR transparency regime exposes the persistence of the deep-rooted political tensions which have long accompanied the EU single financial market project, and how political preferences continue to shape EU financial governance. 27 At present, these tensions and preferences can primarily be associated with the uneasy relationship between single market and euro-area financial governance, and with the resolution of sorts achieved by the February 2016 'New Settlement' for the UK within the EU.
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But the current euro area/single market tensions are simply the most recent expression of persistent and entrenched political differences across the Member States as to how the single financial market should be governed and of the related institutional divergences which shape these differences. 29 In some respects, and particularly at level 2, the MiFIR transparency regime is almost scientific in its dependence on empirical data and assessment. In others, however, and particularly at level 1, it represents a classic EU 'hodge podge' of political compromises. In transparency regime certainly exemplifies the extent to which EU financial market regulation has become centralized and how the notion of a 'single rulebook' has become embedded within EU financial system governance. But it also deploys administrative supervisory governance strategies to entrench regulatory governance. Second, and with respect to regulatory governance, the MiFIR transparency regime exposes the extent to which, some eight years out from the financial crisis, the administrative governance system which supports the EU financial system may come under pressure with respect to rule-making. In particular, the MiFIR transparency regime generates important but potentially intractable challenges with respect to the ability of the current administrative process to revise and suspend rules nimbly.
X.09
This chapter first, however, considers the nature of transparency regulation, the distinctiveness of the EU's approach to transparency, and the main features of the MiFIR transparency regime.
II. TRANSPARENCY REGULATION AND EU FINANCIAL GOVERNANCE
The Purpose of Transparency Regulation
X.10 Transparency regulation governs the mandatory disclosure of the price, volume, and transaction information produced by trading venues and, under certain conditions, from bilateral trades between trading counterparties, and the availability of such disclosures to the market on a real-time basis. These disclosures, particularly in the equity markets, support price formation and, thereby, liquidity. But they also perform a number of related functions. In a transparent marketplace, potential traders can see all the orders entering the market and the transactions already completed, and can accordingly monitor the execution process. 30 Transparency rules can also address fragmentation risk (which arises where trading in an instrument splits across multiple venues) as they 'tie together' execution data from different venues and support price formation, the pooling of liquidity, and the achievement of best execution. Transparency requirements have, in addition, a supervisory dimension: they support supervisors in monitoring the nature of trading and in detecting emerging risks, including with respect to market abuse, and, as they allow supervisors to monitor liquidity levels, market stability. 
